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1 Introduction
This paper studies securely implementable rules in linear production economies with classical
preferences. Securely implementability ?Saijo,, and Yamato, 2007? is defined as dou-
ble implementability in dominant strategy equilibria and Nash equilibria1?. This requirement is
equivalent to the combination of strategy-proofness and the rectangular property ?Saijo,	
and Yamato, 2007?. Strategy-proofness requires that the truthful revelation is a weakly domi-
nant strategy for the agent under the rule. The rectangular property requires that if each agent
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does not gain and lose by changing the agent’s revelation, then the allocation does not change by
the revelations of all the agents under the rule.
Although secure implementability is practically appealing in preventing strategic manipulations
due to Cason, Saijo, , and Yamato ?2006?, previous literature illustrated the difficulty of
finding securely implementable rules with desirable properties2?. Contrary to such illustration, in
linear production economies with classical preferences, this paper shows that the equal budget
free choice rule ?Maniquet and Sprumont, 1999?, that satisfies strategy-proofness, Pareto-
efficiency, and equal treatment of equals, is securely implementable3?. Because the equal budget
free choice rule satisfies non-bossiness ?Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein, 1981? in addition to
strategy-proofness and Pareto-efficiency, this result supports Nishizaki’s ?2018b? result showing
that the combination of strategy-proofness and non-bossiness is equivalent to secure
implementability under Pareto-efficient rules in linear production economies with classical prefer-
ences4?.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model presented
here and Section 3 the properties of rules related to secure implementability. Section 4 demon-
strates the result of this paper.
2 Model
Similar to Maniquet and Sprumont ?1999? and Nishizaki ?2018b?, this paper considers linear
production economies with  agents and  divisible and private goods. Let 
be the set of agents and be the set of goods. For each and each
, let   be consumption of good for agent and 	


 be consump-
tion for agent . Let 	


 be an allocation. In the model presented here, a good can
be transformed into another good by a technology that exhibits constant return to scale. For sim-
plicity, let 	

be the set of feasible allocations.
A preference of an agent is represented by a binary relation defined on 

. For each , let

be a preference for agentandbe the agent’ s indifference preference induced by
. This
paper assumes that each preference is classical, that is, continuous, strictly monotonic, and
strictly convex. For each , let be the set of such preferences for agent . Let 
	


be a profile of preferences andbe the set of profiles of preferences. For each, let
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 	be a profile of preferences other than agent and  
	be the set of
profiles of preferences other than agent . In addition, for each ,  , let 	be a
profile of preferences other than agents and .
Agents collectively choose a feasible allocation according to a rule. Let?be a rule that
associates a feasible allocation 	with a profile of preferences 5?. For each  and
each , let be the consumption for agent at the allocation .
3 Properties of Rules
Saijo,, and Yamato ?2007, Theorem 1? characterized securely implementable rules by
strategy-proofness and the rectangular property ?Saijo, , and Yamato, 2007?.
Strategy-proofness requires that the truthful revelation is a weakly dominant strategy for the
agent under the rule. The rectangular property requires that if each agent does not gain and lose
by changing the agent’s revelation, then the allocation does not change by the revelations of all
the agents under the rule.
Definition 1. The rule satisfies strategy-proofness if and only if for each  and each
, .
Definition 2. The rule satisfies the rectangular property if and only if for each , if
for each , then .
4 Result
Maniquet and Sprumont ?1999? introduced the equal budget free choice rule in linear pro-
duction economies. Let 
	

		be the equal budget set. For each
and each , let 
	
		 for each 	
	be the
set of maximizers of in the equal budget set 
. Note that the set of maximizers of each
preference in the equal budget set is singleton because preferences are classical.
Definition 3. The ruleis the equal budget free choice rule if and only if for each and
each , 
.
In the model presented here, Maniquet and Sprumont ?1999, Theorem 2? characterized the
equal budget free choice rule by strategy-proofness that is necessary for secure implementability,
An Efficient Securely Implementable Allocation Rule in Linear Production Economies ??
?? In this paper, a rule is defied as a direct revelation mechanism associated with a social choice function.
This means that a rule is equivalent to a social choice function.
Pareto-efficiency, and equal treatment of equals6?. The following proposition shows that the equal
budget free choice rule also satisfies the rectangular property that is necessary for secure
implementability.
Proposition. The 	
f satisfies the 
	
.
Proof. Let  be such that for each . Because satisfies
strategy-proofness and each agent’s most preferred consumption in the agent’s budget set is
unique, this implies that
for each  
Together with the uniqueness of each agent’s most preferred consumption in the agent’s budget
set, this implies that
for each  
By ?1?, we find that   . By the uniqueness of each agent’s most preferred
consumption in the agent’s budget set, we also find that 	

	
for each 	
. These imply that
 
By ?2? and the uniqueness of each agent’s most preferred consumption in the agent’s budget set,
we find that. By the uniqueness of each agent’s most preferred
consumption in the agent’s budget set, we also find that 	 

	 
and 	
	
for
each 	
. These imply that
 
By ?3? and ?4?, we find that . By sequentially replacing by
for each 	
in the above manner, we find that . ?
Note that the above proof shows that “unequal” budget free choice rules, that do not satisfy
equal treatment of equals, also satisfy the rectangular property.
Together with characterizations of securely implementable rules and the equal budget free
choice rule, the above proposition implies the following corollary.
Corollary. The 	
is 
.
????????????? ?????????
?? The rule satisfies Pareto-efficiency if and only if for each 	
and each , if 	for each
, then 	for each . The rule  satisfies equal treatment of equals if and only if for each
 and each , if , then .
In linear production economies with classical preferences, Nishizaki ?2018b? showed that the
combination of strategy-proofness and non-bossiness ?Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein, 1981? is
equivalent to secure implementability under Pareto-efficient rules7?. Because the equal budget
free choice rule satisfies non-bossiness in addition to strategy-proofness and Pareto-efficiency,
the above corollary supports Nishizaki’s ?2018b? result8?.
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